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Conventional wisdom and increasing empirical evidence in microfinance hold that 
women are better risks than men. In the present work, a logit model controlling for 
a range of borrower and loan characteristics was carried out to assess the validity of 
this statement by comparing repayment rates. The study includes a sample of loans 
disbursed by a Nicaraguan microfinance institution during the years 2003-2004, a 
period characterized by high oil prices. A dichotomous dependent variable is created, 
taking the value of 1 if the credit turned out to be of the best quality i.e. an “A” credit 
by Nicaraguan regulations, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is regressed on 
variables summarizing the characteristics of the borrower and the loan to investigate 
the impact of gender on repayment performance. The results provide significant 
evidence that female client’s repayment performance is in fact better than that of 
male’s at the conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the results 
also show that the perceived difference in gender risk is lower than what popular 
wisdom would suggest when borrower characteristics and other exogenous economic 
variables are taken into account. With the present sample, we conclude that other 
characteristics of the borrower as well as changes in the economic environment can 
have a similar or larger impact on risk than gender when it comes to repayment 
performance.
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1. Introduction
Microfinance in the context of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) is about making 
small, short term loans to the self-employed poor who generally do not have credit-
bureau records or formal wage jobs (Schreiner, 2004a, p. 1). Usually, the clients are 
small merchants or manufacturers who do not keep formal financial statements and 
do not have access to conventional banking. 
The process by which a micro-credit is approved or rejected in poor countries 
differs from homologous procedures in rich countries in several aspects (Schreiner, 
2004a, p. 1). The traditional process of pre-disbursement of a micro-credit in LDCs 
starts when a borrower submits a loan application at one of the branches of the micro-
lender. A loan officer then checks the application against an initial screen. If the 
loan-officer considers that the applicant could be a good candidate, he or she makes 
a visit to the potential borrower at his work place to take note of the characteristics of 
the applicant’s business on the field. This generally includes checking the applicant’s 
cash, inventory, and other information so as to make a rudimentary approximation 
of the financial statements of the business. The loan officer also looks for qualitative 
data and takes note of the characteristics of the borrower. These characteristics range 
from the occupation of the borrower, gender, marital status, etc. Moreover, he or 
she asks the potential borrower’s neighbours to give reference about the applicant’s 
creditworthiness. The loan officer then subjectively evaluates whether the applicant 
is a good candidate to be submitted to a credit committee evaluation. Finally, in 
the credit committee the loan officer determines in conjunction with the branch 
manager whether to approve or reject the application.
In this mainly judgemental process loan officers and branch managers often 
have to rely on conventional wisdom for making good decisions, and in this regard 
one of the most widely held views among lenders is that women are better risks than 
men when it comes to disbursing micro-loans. Can this often strongly held view be 
justified through econometric analysis? If so, how much ‘safer’ are female clients? 
Does the perceived difference in risk persist when controlling for other factors such 
as the client’s occupation, age, marital status among others? 
The motivation of this paper is to investigate these questions which address 
key issues in the allocation of loans among the self-employed poor in less developed 
countries; using a Nicaraguan microfinance institution dataset. The results of our 
case study indicate that female client’s repayment performance is in fact better than 
male’s at the 1% level of significance. However, we also find that the gender gap in 
risk is not particularly a large one and that other significant factors involved can 
have a similar or larger impact when it comes to repayment performance. The aim of 
this paper is thus to acquaint loan decision makers of all potentially relevant aspects 
which should be considered in order to increase repayment rates and improved 
overall efficiency in the microfinance system. The econometric tools employed are 
not without limitations and these are also explored.
This article is organised as follows: in section 2 we perform a brief review of 
the relevant academic literature. In Section 3 we describe our methodology, data and 
variable selection process. The main results of the study, their interpretation and 
constraints are discussed in section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5. 
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2. Background and Previous Work
Statistical credit scoring has been commonly used for assessing microfinance 
performance and it uses information about the performance of past loans, obtained 
from a database, in order to predict the performance of new loans. Hence, a key 
assumption of the model is that the future will be similar to the past. The model is 
built using quantitative measures and characteristics of past disbursements so that 
when one introduces the characteristic of a new application in the credit scoring 
formula one obtains a score that gives the analyst an objective measure of the 
probability of default of the case at hand. It is important to note that the formula 
weights different characteristics of the borrower, the lender and the loan and then 
produces an objective estimate of the probability of risk that a borrower will not 
repay (Schreiner, 2000, p. 3).  This contrasts with the traditional judgemental scoring 
method that relies exclusively on qualitative information held in the heads of the 
loan officers and branch managers.
Since micro-lenders only keep records of approved loans on their databases 
the estimated parameters of the scoring model are subject to sample selection 
bias when the models are applied to all candidates (Schreiner, 2004b, p. 15). This 
happens because the models are fitted to distinguish good loans from bad ones 
among approved applicants only and it does not include information about rejected 
applicants (Roszbach, 2004, p. 946). The figure below (based on Schreiner, 2005, 
p. 35) is a good illustration of the way in which it is proposed that statistical credit 
scoring should be used in microfinance.
Figure 1. The proposed use of statistical credit scoring in microfinance
Once an application passes the traditional screen, the statistical scoring 
formula is applied: if the formula shows that the applicant’s probability of default 
is below some predetermined lower threshold, the application is considered to be 
“very safe” and it is approved without further enquiry. If the applicant’s probability 
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of default is “intermediate”, then the credit committee should do an extra review 
of the application in order to make sure the applicant is a good risk or take 
actions in order to reduce the exposure to risk. Finally, if the formula shows that 
the applicant is “very risky”, then the application is rejected even though it had 
passed the traditional screen. As can be seen in Figure 1, statistical credit scoring in 
microfinance does not offer to save time and money by eliminating the loan officer’s 
“traditional” individualized evaluation. Instead, the proposed use of credit scoring 
in microfinance is as a final check to detect some high risk cases that may have 
sneaked through the standard judgemental screens (Schreiner, 2005, p. 6). Schreiner 
(2005, pp. 10-14) proposes that credit scoring can bring the following benefits to 
microfinance institutions2: 
• Although the method does not save time in the initial evaluation of loans, 
it does save time for loan officers in collections after disbursement. This 
happens because loan officers spend less time visiting clients that are in 
arrears thanks to improvements in portfolio quality. As a result there is 
an efficiency gain which leaves loan officers more time to look for new 
clients.
• Another benefit of statistical credit scoring is that it can be used as a 
teaching tool. Once the formula is built one can obtain vital information 
about which are the key risk factors when analysing applications. This 
information can then be used to train novice loan officers.
• Finally, statistical credit scoring can induce managers to adopt a culture 
of explicit data decision making. Managers can use their databases to 
build statistical credit scoring models with data up to a certain point in 
time and then apply it to cases that come later (in their databases) with 
the objective of checking the predictive power of the scorecards. Managers 
can then adjust rejection thresholds on their scoring models and then see 
the results of potential scoring policies before they are implemented.
Thanks to these and other benefits, statistical credit scoring promises to reduce 
the costs of making loans to the self-employed poor in LDCs. This would be desirable 
from a social point of view because assuming that the microfinance institutions are 
socially oriented and/or that there is a competitive credit market, these efficiencies 
can be passed on to borrowers in the form of a lower cost of capital. However, 
how well can this technique work in the context of LDCs? Table 1 summarises the 
relevant previous work on statistical credit scoring in microfinance that has been 
published. The first two columns show the name of the author, details about the 
publication of the article and the country in which the study was performed. The 
third and fourth columns describe the data from which the scorecard was estimated. 
Finally, the last two columns summarise the research approach, that is, how the data 
was gathered and analysed, and the results and conclusions reached on each of the 
past works. As can be seen from the table, the microfinance credit scoring empirical 
studies in LDCs are relatively recent. We can compare the usefulness of these models 
as statistical scorecards on three main aspects: data collection technique, sample size, 
and tests of predictive power.
2  Please note that this list is not exhaustive and it is included for illustrative purposes.
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The two main approaches to data collection are surveys and micro-lenders’ 
databases. The works of Reinke (1998) and Schreiner (2004a) rely on information 
that the microfinance institutions already collect, while Viganò (1998), Sharma and 
Zeller (1997) and Zeller (1998) use information from surveys. Caire and Kossmann 
(2002, p. 8) report that to build a useful statistical model when using a micro-lendr’s 
database one requires payment performance data for approximately 15,000 loans. 
From table 1, we can see that Schreiner (2004a) has a sample size large enough 
(39,956 loans) to comply with this requirement while the other scorecard built 
from a database (Reinke, 1998) uses 1,641 observations only. Even though in 
models derived from surveys the sample size is smaller, it is worth noting that the 
information gathered is more detailed and generally includes more variables than 
the data gathered from micro-lenders’ databases. However, this comes at a higher 
data collection cost for both the borrower and the lender. Regarding this last point, 
Hand and Henley (1997, p. 528) point out that there is a trade-off on the number of 
variables to be included in the scorecard: if the data set is large enough over-fitting 
problems may not occur and one might try to use as many variables as possible, 
however too many questions will likely deter applicants, who might go elsewhere. 
It is important to note that only Schreiner (2004a) checks the predictive power 
of his model by using ‘out of sample data’ in order to check how his scorecard would 
have performed in practice. While Viganò checks the predictive power of her model 
by using the same data from which it was estimated the other three studies do not 
perform tests of predictive power. Apparently, the reason for this is that these latter 
models aim to detect characteristics of the borrowers that are linked with risk and 
not to develop scorecards destined to be used in practice (Schreiner, 2004a, p. 5). 
The methods used to analyse the data in previous studies include factor 
analysis, tobit, probit and logit models. According to Hand and Henley (1997, p. 
535) there is no overall “best” method, and what is best depends on the details of the 
problem. Finally, regarding the conclusions of the different papers in the literature, 
it is worth noting that all authors suggest, to a certain extent, that credit scoring 
techniques can actually be used in microfinance. 
Several previous studies in the microfinance literature have investigated the 
relationship between the characteristics of borrowers and their loans and repayment 
performance. Among the most known papers are: Schreiner (2004a), Reinke (1998), 
Viganò (1998), Zeller (1998) and Sharma and Zeller (1997). Zeller (1998) and 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) investigate the performance of credit groups and therefore 
these two articles are not directly relevant to the present study. On the other hand, 
while Viganò (1998) investigates the performance of individual clients, the author 
does not report in her article the estimated impact of gender or other factors in 
repayment performance.
This leaves us with two papers which are directly relevant to the present 
work: Schreiner (2004a) and Reinke (1998). These two papers do present findings 
regarding the impact of the borrower’s gender and other characteristics on 
repayment performance; interestingly the results in these two articles differ. While 
Reinke (1998, pp. 53-54) finds that women are significantly better risks than men, 
Schreiner (2004a, p. 11), on the other hand, finds that, at least for his sample, there 
is no statistically significant difference in risk between men and women. Moreover, 
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Schreiner indicates that his results show that if other characteristics of the loan are 
taken into account, many of which are related to gender (such as occupation) “much 
of the gender gap in risk vanishes”. Therefore, it is possible that the difference 
between these two results may be due to the correct specification of the model. 
In this article, we aim to contribute to the microfinance literature by presenting a 
“correctly” specified model in the sense that it passes a basic misspecification test, 
namely the Ramsey RESET test.  
Table 1. Summary of previous published studies of ‘statistical credit scoring’ in 
microfinance
Authors/ 
publication
Country 
in study Sample size
Sample 
details
Research approach 
(instruments)
Results and 
conclusions
Viganò 
(1998)
Burkina 
Faso
118 
individual 
customers
Sample was 
obtained 
from the 
population of 
all individual 
customers 
of a bank in 
Burkina Faso 
in 1993.
The data were 
not complete 
for all 
observations 
requiring that 
the original 
sample be 
reduced to 
100.
Quantitative and 
qualitative information 
was collected through 
questionnaires and 
direct interviews 
with loan managers. 
The questionnaire 
targeted population 
topologies and loan 
characteristics.
Selection of variables 
was determined 
by the number of 
observations for which 
they were available.
Factor analysis was 
applied to the final 
set of variables. The 
characteristics were 
condensed into 11 
factors.
In spite of 
limited available 
information the 
results showed 
that credit scoring 
techniques 
could be used in 
microfinance.
The original sample 
classification 
is satisfactory 
for defaults 
as it correctly 
classifies 92% of 
observations.
Sharma 
and Zeller 
(1997) 
Bangladesh From 
1,725 loans 
recorded, 
a subset of 
868 loans 
was used
Loan 
transactions 
collected from 
128 borrower 
groups 
belonging to 
three credit 
programs in 
Bangladesh.
Data was 
collected 
during 1994.
Survey conducted 
by the International 
Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) of 128 
borrower groups.
Groups were 
randomly selected 
from 41 villages across 
Bangladesh.
A formal questionnaire 
was administered to 
the chairperson of each 
group.
Using tobit 
analysis, specific 
tests are performed 
on hypothesised 
determinants of group 
risk.
The Study identifies 
factors that affect 
group repayment 
rates.
The analysis 
indicates that 
factors such as asset 
and enterprise 
diversity within 
groups significantly 
affect repayment 
rates.
The conclusion 
is that if basic 
principles of 
prudential banking 
are adhered to, 
repayment rates 
can be good even 
in poor and remote 
communities.
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Reinke 
(1998)
South 
Africa
1,641 
borrowers
The data were 
copied from 
the lending 
institution’s 
associated 
Informal 
Business 
Training 
Trust records 
in April 1995.
The data 
comprised 
all existing 
borrowers. 
Database of a South 
African micro-lender.
The variables in the 
data-set were chosen to 
capture the social and 
business characteristics 
of the clientele and 
also because of data 
availability criteria.
Probit estimation 
was carried out to 
determine the relative 
importance of the 
variables for repayment 
probabilities.
The article argues 
that efficient 
institutional 
design can make 
microfinance 
lending financially 
sustainable.
Women are 
shown to be more 
conscientious with 
their repayments. 
The results suggest 
that the average 
repayment may be 
improved if women 
were to participate 
in greater numbers.
Zeller 
(1998) 
Madagascar 168 group 
loans
The loans in 
the dataset 
were obtained 
by a random 
sample of 146 
groups from 
six different 
lending 
programmes 
in 1992.
Because 
of missing 
values for 
some of the 
variables the 
number of 
cases used in 
the regression 
analysis is 
141.
The data was gathered 
by performing a survey.
Questionnaires 
targeted households, 
credit groups and 
communities.
The model was 
estimated by using 
the tobit maximum 
likelihood technique.
The regression model 
incorporates variables 
that reflect the process 
of group formation, 
characteristics of 
the group as well as 
their programme and 
community.
The variables in 
the model were 
hypothesised to 
influence repayment 
rate directly or 
indirectly.
This is an empirical 
analysis to test a 
theoretical model 
to explain the 
performance of 
credit groups.
Groups that 
are located in 
communities with 
a high exposure 
to covariance risks 
were fount to have 
a significantly lower 
repayment rate than 
those with lower 
exposure.
Groups with higher 
levels of social 
cohesion were 
found to have a 
better repayment 
rate.
Schreiner 
(2004)
 
Bolivia 39,956 
loans in 
1988-96 
10,555 
loans in 
1997
 Loans repaid 
in 1988-1996 
are used 
to create 
scorecard.
Loans repaid 
in 1997 are 
used to test 
scorecard.
Database of a Bolivian 
micro-lender.
The credit scoring 
formula or scorecard 
was derived from a 
logit model.
The scorecard relies 
on characteristics that 
most microlenders 
already collect or are 
easy to collect.
Scorecard is tested 
at different risk 
thresholds in order 
to determine how 
well it separates 
“good” loans from 
“bad” ones.
The scorecard 
separates “good” 
from “bad” loans. 
On average it 
assigns higher risk 
to “bad” than to 
“good” loans.
The scoring 
model for arrears 
developed in this 
paper suggests that 
statistical credit 
scoring can help 
microfinance.
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3. Methodology, Variable Selection and Data Collection
While performing our literature survey, it was evident that the logit model had 
significant advantages in ease of calculation and hypothesis testing procedures 
(Gujarati, 1995, pp. 567-568) and also that it was easier to perform the RESET test 
(manually) for the logit in comparison with e.g. a tobit model. For this reason, we 
decided to do a logit model for our scorecard. 
The process of variable selection was based on the theoretical and empirical 
models of Reinke (1998) and Schreiner (2004b). We have thus relied for the most 
part on the variables that had shown to be linked with risk of default and also on 
variables that the microfinance literature suggests that are relevant but that have 
not been tested (because the data were not available)3.  Consequently, the petition 
of data from the Nicaraguan microfinance institution included the socio-economic 
characteristics of the individual borrower, the lender and the loan. It should be 
mentioned that it was not possible to secure full access to the database of the lender 
in order to investigate if there were more variables available that could be used. The 
management of the Nicaraguan bank kindly agreed to provide information about 
the variables requested, but they would not consent to give a complete list of all the 
items contained in their database. Table 2 gives a list of the variables used in the 
model.
Table 2. List of variables for the study 
Number Dependent Variable Type of variable
 Whether or not the loan had a spell of arrears of more than 15 days binary
Independent Variables
 Characteristics of the borrower:  
1 Gender binary
2 Sector of the borrower’s business (e.g. merchant, manufacturer) discrete
3 Age continuous
4 Marital status binary
5 Whether the client is new or old binary
6 Whether the client had a spell of  arrears of more than 15 days in the previous loan binary
 Characteristics of the lender:  
7 Branch where the loan was disbursed discrete
 Characteristics of the loan:  
8 Repayment period continuous
9 Type of Guarantee discrete
10 Interest rate (in percentages) discrete
11 Loan size (in U.S. dollars) continuous
12 Foreign currency binary
3  For a comprehensive list of the relevant variables see Schreiner (2004b, pp. 23-24). 
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The sample used consists of 48,6024 loans disbursed by a Nicaraguan 
microfinance institution between the 2nd of January 2003 and the 30th of June 
2004. Of this sample, 3,114 loans went “bad” (6.41%), where bad is defined as a loan 
with at least one spell of arrears of more than 15 days. We have chosen to use this 
definition of “bad” with two motivations in mind. First, according to Nicaraguan 
bank regulatory bodies, microfinance “A” loans are the ones with no arrears or with a 
spell of arrears of up to 15 days at a given point in time (Rosales, 2002, p. 3); second, 
to make the results of this article comparable to those in previous work which use 
this definition such as Schreiner (2004a). Note that loans classified “B” and below 
are costly because they require extra collection efforts. This implies that loan officers 
lose time visiting clients in arrears instead of looking for new clients. In addition, 
regulatory bodies require banks to weight their assets on a risk basis. Consequently, 
in order to comply with solvency ratios, banks and microfinance institutions with 
bad quality portfolios must keep larger amounts of capital. As in previous studies 
in the microfinance literature, it is important to note that since the lender only 
keeps data on accepted applicants and information from credit reference agencies 
(credit-bureaux) is not available, in the present article we model risk conditional 
on the applicant having passed the microfinance institution’s standard evaluation. 
Therefore, in the present work, when we talk about ‘risk’ or the ‘impact on risk’ we 
refer to ‘post evaluation risk’.
Consequently, in the model specification we have focused on capturing the 
probability that a loan will go “bad” which can be expressed as a function of the 
characteristics of (a) the individual borrower (b) his/her loan (c) the lender and (d) 
the economic environment. 
 Hence, the logit model is the following: 
                                     Prob(arrears>15i = 1 | xi) = F(xiß)
The dependent variable “arrears>15” is a binary variable taking the value of 1 
if the loan had a spell of arrears of 15 days or more during its life and 0 otherwise, 
F is the logistic cumulative distribution function, x
i 
is a vector of values for the ith 
observation of the independent variables and ß is a vector of parameters. 
Next, we summarise our a priori expectations concerning the impact that 
the characteristics of the borrowers, the lender and the loan should have on the 
dependent variable. Note that the dependent variable is whether or not the loan had 
a spell of arrears of 15 days or more.
•	 Business	 sector: as will be seen below, we set up a complete range of 
dummy variables for the sector in which the borrower works. The base 
category is borrowers that have a high school diploma but no other 
qualification and that engage in a variety of service sector activities. At 
this point it is not clear on a priori grounds if the dummy variables will be 
significantly riskier than the base category or vice versa. At the moment 
4  The initial sample we obtained from the microfinance institution contained 48,625 loans; however, we 
dropped 23 observations in which the age of the clients was below 16 years. Our results are robust to including 
these observations in the database.
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we only have references from the literature indicating that the merchant 
sector should be relatively safe, and also that carpenters have been found 
to be amongst the most risky clients (Schreiner, 2004a, p. 12).
•	 Gender	of	borrower: different opinions in the literature can be found 
as to the risk implied by this variable. Reinke (1998, p. 54) reports that 
women are “definitively more reliable than males”. However, Schreiner 
(2004a, p. 11) argues that if other characteristics are taken into account, 
such as the sector of the firm, gender is much less predictive.
•	 Age: we expect that older people are more stable, careful and responsible. 
Moreover, since the loans in our study have very short maturity, we believe 
that the chance of ill health may not be so important. Therefore we expect 
on a priori grounds that risk decreases with age. 
•	 Marital	 status: we expect that married people are more constant and 
dependable than divorced people and people having free unions. 
Therefore we expect on a priori grounds that risk is lower for loans issued 
to married individuals.
•	 Repayment	history	of	the	borrower: there are two variables in the model 
that account for the repayment history of the borrower. The first one 
indicates if the borrower is a new client or not. It is sensible to expect that 
if the client is new the risk of the loan will be greater than otherwise. This 
is because in the case of microfinance in Nicaragua there are no credit 
bureaux that can supply information about the credit record of a given 
borrower. The second variable indicates whether an old client had a spell 
of arrears of 15 or more in the previous loan. It can be expected that if 
the client had costly arrears in the past it is more likely that he or she will 
also have costly arrears in the next loan. 
•	 Branch	of	the	microfinance	institution: dummy variables for each of the 
branches of the Nicaraguan financial institution are created; the reference 
category is the central office. On a priori grounds it can be expected that 
the branches should be riskier than the central office since the central 
office concentrates on a few larger loans that receive special review before 
being disbursed.
•	 Length	of	repayment	period: clearly, one can expect that the longer the 
time to maturity, the greater the chance that a given borrower will fall into 
a spell of arrears. 
•	 Type	of	guarantee: there are three types of guarantee for the Nicaraguan 
microfinance institution: mortgage (M), joint liability (JL) and guarantee 
on the personal belongings (PB) of the borrower. On a priori grounds, it 
can be expected that a loan in which the guarantee consists exclusively of 
PB, has been considered to be less risky by the credit committee than a 
loan where the guarantee is “JL plus PB”. Also, one can expect that a loan 
requiring only JL as guarantee has been categorized by the traditional 
evaluation as being less risky than another requiring PB as guarantee. 
Note that plain JL is the base or reference category. We form no a priori 
expectations about the variable “mortgage” because this guarantee is 
usually required for larger loans, different from the above.
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•	 Interest	rate: regarding this variable, it is sensible to expect on a priori 
grounds that the higher the interest rate the higher should be the risk 
involved in the loan. The reason is that, because of the institutions’ credit 
policy, the credit committee will charge a higher interest rate to cases that 
are regarded as being more risky.
•	 Loan	size: Schreiner (2004a, p. 12) reports that the link between risk and 
the amount disbursed is positive but weak. According to Schreiner, if 
this variable is found to be insignificant at the conventional levels, then 
this could indicate that the lender is successfully rationing borrowers 
suspected as high risks.
•	 Foreign	 currency: during the period of our study, the Nicaraguan 
currency, the “córdoba”, was pegged to the US dollar. Moreover, all 
lending contracts required loans to be repaid in their equivalent to US 
dollars. Hence we do not expect any extra exposure to currency risk for 
borrowers with loans in US dollars above the risk that other borrowers 
already incur. However, this variable is introduced in the model because 
we expect on a priori grounds that this group of borrowers may have 
a higher level of risk than other borrowers because loans in dollars are 
usually requested by entrepreneurs who travel abroad to do their business 
(e.g. to Panama), or that have foreign suppliers.
 In addition to the above variables that are commonly used in the literature 
for the assessment of repayment performance, we also included a dummy variable 
named ‘oilprice’ which takes the value of 1 if the loan expired after the 30th of 
June 2004. During the second half of 2004 there were important increases in the 
international price of oil. For a country like Nicaragua, which produces no oil, it is 
plausible that this change had adverse consequences for the economy of the country, 
which in turn may have affected the repayment performance of the clients of the 
micro-finance institution.
 An inspection of Nicaraguan newspaper editions for the time period under 
study provides anecdotic evidence to support the hypothesis that the price of oil is 
having a negative impact on the economic environment in Nicaragua. For instance, a 
journal article published on November 15th 2004  in El Nuevo Diario, the journal with 
the second highest level of circulation in the country, reports that the authorities of 
INE [National Institute of Energy]  point out that “the price of oil, which is between 
46 and 47 dollars per barrel at the moment is substantially above the historic average 
of 27 to 30 dollars per barrel” and that “this price level is exerting great pressure 
on the finances of the country since oil expenses normally consume 30% of the 
national export income; it is believed that this year these expenditures will rise way 
above this ceiling” (Sánchez Rizo, 2004). 
 Figure 2 shows the development of the spot price of Brent Oil in U.S. 
dollars per barrel for the period in study. In the period from May 2004 to May 2005 
the price of oil was higher than the previous period. Moreover, the volatility of oil 
prices was much greater, which may have contributed to business uncertainty. 
 Figure 3 was designed to investigate the impact that the adverse business 
conditions may have had on borrower repayment performance and to help determine 
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when the unfavourable conditions probably started affecting loan repayment 
performance. To generate the figure, we first grouped all loans according to the 
month in which they were disbursed. Then we calculated monthly percentages of 
“bad” loans. Finally, we broke down the “bad” loan percentages according to the 
time to maturity in the contract of the loans.
 
Figure 2. Spot Brent Oil prices in U.S. dollars for the period in study5
Figure 3. Disbursement date and behaviour of arrears in different maturity groups
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From Figure 3 one can notice a marked increase in the percentage of “bad” 
outcomes in the loans with a life period extending beyond the second half of 2004. 
It is interesting to observe that there is a strong increase in the percentage of “bad” 
loans among the contracts with maturities greater than 270 days that were issued 
between July-03 and December-03, from 1.05% in July-03 to 7.37% in Dec-03. 
Also, for the loans issued between Jan-04 and June-04 there is a sharp increase in 
the percentage of bad loans in the contracts with maturities between 181-270 days, 
from 1.30% in January to 5.94% in June. There is also a steady increase in the 
percentage of bad loans for loans with maturities between 91-180 days issued in the 
period between April-04 and June-04, from 0.49% per month to 2.23% per month. 
Finally, from June-04 to August-04 there is an increase in the percentage of bad loans 
for loans with maturities of less than 90 days, from 0.16% in June-04 to 0.50% in 
August-04. 
These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the worsening 
of the economic conditions started affecting loan repayment performance at some 
point during the months of June and July 2004 almost coinciding with the start of a 
more rapid rise in the price of oil. Naturally, the selection of this date is of necessity 
an approximation. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the observations in the sample data, 
according to the selected dependent and independent variables. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all observations in the sample data
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
arrears>15
1 if client had arrears > 15 days in the present 
loan, 0 otherwise
0.0641 0.2449 0 1
artisan 1 if artisan, 0 otherwise 0.0104 0.1013 0 1
carpenter 1 if carpenter, 0 otherwise 0.0021 0.0462 0 1
merchant 1 if trader, 0 otherwise 0.8811 0.3237 0 1
seamstress 1 if seamstress, 0 otherwise 0.0102 0.1006 0 1
baker 1 if baker, 0 otherwise 0.0028 0.0530 0 1
othermanuf 1 if other manufacturer, 0 otherwise 0.0335 0.1800 0 1
grocery 1 if grocery, 0 otherwise 0.0033 0.0575 0 1
transport 1 if transport, 0 otherwise 0.0113 0.1057 0 1
professionals 1 if professional, 0 otherwise 0.0116 0.1073 0 1
skillwrk 1 if skilled worker, 0 otherwise 0.0038 0.0617 0 1
unskillwork 1 if unskilled worker, 0 otherwise 0.0289 0.1676 0 1
male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.2909 0.4542 0 1
married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.5099 0.4999 0 1
lnsize Loan size in U.S. dollars, continuous variable 504.27 876.98 19.28 30,000.00
age Age of borrower at disbursement date in years 41.80 10.77 16.51 94.30
repayperiod
Repayment period in days, continuous 
variable
208 103 5 394
intrate Monthly Interest rate (percentage) 0.0490 0.0059 0.0085 0.0550
mortgage   
1 if the guarantee includes mortgage, 0 
otherwise
0.0080 0.0889 0 1
jointliability   
1 if the guarantee includes joint liability, 0 
otherwise
0.7120 0.4529 0 1
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persbelong
1 if the guarantee includes client’s personal 
belongings, 0 otherwise
0.9832 0.1284 0 1
currency 1 if currency is USA dollars, 0 otherwise 0.0115 0.1067 0 1
new 1 if client is new, 0 otherwise 0.2364 0.4249 0 1
prevarrears
1 if client had arrears > 15 days in previous 
loan, 0 otherwise
0.0026 0.0509 0 1
branch1 1 if branch is branch 1, 0 otherwise 0.0757 0.2645 0 1
branch2 1 if branch is branch 2, 0 otherwise 0.0581 0.2339 0 1
branch3 1 if branch is branch 3, 0 otherwise 0.1265 0.3324 0 1
branch4 1 if branch is branch 4, 0 otherwise 0.1276 0.3336 0 1
branch5 1 if branch is branch 5, 0 otherwise 0.0548 0.2277 0 1
branch6 1 if branch is branch 6, 0 otherwise 0.1018 0.3025 0 1
branch7 1 if branch is branch 7, 0 otherwise 0.0852 0.2792 0 1
branch8 1 if branch is branch 8, 0 otherwise 0.0625 0.2421 0 1
branch9 1 if branch is branch 9, 0 otherwise 0.0832 0.2762 0 1
branch10 1 if branch is branch 10, 0 Otherwise 0.0727 0.2597 0 1
branch11 1 if branch is branch 11, 0 otherwise 0.0606 0.2387 0 1
branch12 1 if branch is branch 12, 0 otherwise 0.0323 0.1769 0 1
branch13 1 if branch is branch 13, 0 otherwise 0.0437 0.2044 0 1
branch14 1 if branch is branch 14, 0 otherwise 0.0071 0.0837 0 1
branch15 1 if branch is branch 15, 0 otherwise 0.0062 0.0786 0 1
branch16 1 if branch is branch 16, 0 otherwise 0.0011 0.0336 0 1
centraloffice
1 if loan is disbursed in the central office, 0 
otherwise
0.0008 0.0276 0 1
oilprice 1 if loan matures after 30/06/04, 0 otherwise 0.4133 0.4924 0 1
4. Results
4.1. Logistic Regression
Table 4 presents the results of the estimated logit model derived from the data 
described above. As we mentioned before, the model is a logit estimated by using 
the maximum likelihood method. The dependent variable is “arrears>15”; this is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if the loan had a spell of arrears of 15 days or 
more during its life and 0 otherwise.  The results were obtained using the STATA 8 
software. Note that in the header of table 4, “Log pseudo-likelihood” corresponds 
to the value of the log likelihood at convergence. The number of observations is 
48,602. Wald chi2(41) = 2946.9 is the value of a Wald chi-squared for the test of the 
null hypothesis that all of the coefficients associated with independent variables are 
simultaneously zero. The p-value is indicated by Prob > chi2 = 0 and hence the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are simultaneously zero is rejected at all conventional 
significance levels. Pseudo R2 is the measure of fit known as McFadden’s R2, also 
known as the “likelihood-ratio index”. It compares a model with just the intercept to 
a model with all parameters (Long & Freese, 2003). 
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Table 4. Results
Logit estimates Number of obs   =      48602
 
Wald chi2(41)     =     2946.9
 
Prob > chi2         =              0
 
Pseudo R2          =     0.2272 
  
Log pseudolikelihood = -8940.2846
  
  Robust   
arrears>15        Definition Coef.   Std. Err. z  
artisan  1 if artisan, 0 otherwise -0.1493811 0.2012283 -0.74  
carpenter  1 if carpenter, 0 otherwise 0.2387077 0.2934317 0.81  
merchant  1 if trader, 0 otherwise -0.1966845 0.0961874 -2.04 **
seamstress  1 if seamstress, 0 otherwise -0.4161685 0.2036856 -2.04 **
baker  1 if baker, 0 otherwise -0.5465168 0.3676158 -1.49  
othermanuf   1 if other manufacturer, 0 otherwise 0.0125404 0.1351197 0.09  
grocery 1 if grocery, 0 otherwise -1.601503 0.4353523 -3.68 *
transport  1 if transport, 0 otherwise -0.5600704 0.1881701 -2.98 *
professionals  1 if professional, 0 otherwise -0.123267 0.1607943 -0.77  
skillwrk 1 if skilled worker, 0 otherwise -0.5172441 0.2466334 -2.10 **
male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.1622637 0.0447026 3.63 *
married 1 if married, 0 otherwise -0.1958985 0.0407113 -4.81 *
lnsize  Loan size in U.S. dollars, continuous variable -0.0001317 0.0000481 -2.74 *
lnsize2  Square of lnsize 7.88E-09 2.56E-09 3.07 *
age  Age of borrower in years, continuous variable -0.0145667 0.0018986 -7.67 *
repayperiod   Repayment period in days, continuous variable 0.0148225 0.0016662 8.90 *
repayperiod2  Square of repayperiod -0.0000152 3.16E-06 -4.81 *
intrate   Monthly interest rate (percentage) 13.22084 3.905531 3.39 *
mortgage   1 if the guarantee includes mortgage, 0 otherwise -0.1003047 0.2674882 -0.37  
jointliability   1 if the guarantee includes joint liability, 0 otherwise 0.1750788 0.05842 3.00 *
persbelong 1 if the guarantee includes client’s personal belongings, 0 otherwise 0.1947813 0.1325769 1.47  
currency    1 if currency is USA dollars, 0 otherwise 0.2490385 0.1672549 1.49  
new    1 if customer is new, 0 otherwise 0.4876172 0.0444901 10.96 *
prevarrears  1 if customer had arrears > 15 days in previous loan, 0 otherwise 1.561937 0.2666845 5.86 *
branch1  1 if branch is branch 1, 0 otherwise -0.4547961 0.5335187 -0.85  
branch2    1 if branch is branch 2, 0 otherwise 0.2559626 0.5318795 0.48  
branch3  1 if branch is branch 3, 0 otherwise -0.4387723 0.5325582 -0.82  
branch4  1 if branch is branch 4, 0 otherwise -0.3061833 0.5321612 -0.58  
branch5   1 if branch is branch 5, 0 otherwise -0.396935 0.5313132 -0.75  
branch6 1 if branch is branch 6, 0 otherwise -0.5892935 0.5336401 -1.10  
branch7   1 if branch is branch 7, 0 otherwise -0.441166 0.5329375 -0.83  
branch8  1 if branch is branch 8, 0 otherwise -0.4676275 0.5327621 -0.88  
branch9  1 if branch is branch 9, 0 otherwise -0.7110977 0.5362554 -1.33  
branch10   1 if branch is branch 10, 0 Otherwise -0.3674053 0.5343074 -0.69  
branch11 1 if branch is branch 11, 0 otherwise -0.2687152 0.5333652 -0.50  
branch12    1 if branch is branch 12, 0 otherwise 0.1748783 0.533798 0.33  
branch13     1 if branch is branch 13, 0 otherwise -0.165788 0.5340773 -0.31  
branch14  1 if branch is branch 14, 0 otherwise -0.8984887 0.5788471 -1.55  
branch15   1 if branch is branch 15, 0 otherwise 0.0944552 0.5495912 0.17  
branch16     1 if branch is branch 16, 0 otherwise -0.8449208 0.644088 -1.31  
oilprice  1 if loan matures after 30/06/04, 0 otherwise 2.23579 0.065081 34.35 *
_cons  Constant -6.809966 0.5812038 -11.72 *
* significant at the 1% level (two sided test)
** significant at the 5% level (two sided test)
*** significant at the 10% level (two sided test)
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The left column lists the variables in the model, with the dependent variable 
situated at the top. A definition of each of the variables is found in the second 
column. The column “Coef.” contains the ML estimates. Column “Robust Std. 
Err.” is the standard error of the estimates. Since robust to heteroskedasticity ‘White 
standard errors’ were found to be very close to the “traditional” standard errors, 
heteroscedasticity is not likely to be a problem. However, it is probably safer to allow 
for heteroskedasticity, hence we decided to use the White standard errors. The 
resulting ‘z-test’, equal to the estimate divided by its standard error, is labelled z. 
With the estimated values of the latent variable on which the logit is based, we can 
use the logistic cumulative distribution function to obtain predicted probabilities 
(Long & Freese, 2003, pp. 110-113). The latter probabilities are the basis of the 
discussion of our results in the following sub-section. 
A RESET test was performed on this model in order to detect for omitted 
variable and/or functional form misspecification. The following table shows that 
the test statistic of the RESET test was insignificant at any conventional level of 
significance.
Table 5. Test Statistic of the RESET
 Dependent Variable = arrears>15 Robust
z
Level of 
significanceVariable for test Coef. Std. Err.
xbeta2 0.0017809 0.0151395 0.12
Not significant 
at usual levels
The result of the test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
model is correctly specified. Thus, the model passes the RESET test. Naturally, this 
does not imply that the model can be considered “flawless”. It means that the model 
passes a minimum quality check so that it is reasonable to attempt to identify the 
links between the characteristics of the borrower and repayment risk. Although the 
presented scalar measure of fit is still low (which might be interpreted as indicating 
that the model does not have an excellent fit), it can be shown that the model 
classifies the observations into “goods” and “bads” in such a way which is acceptable 
and useful for microfinance institutions (see Table 6), especially, if we evaluate the 
model under the assumption that the future will be similar to the past and in the 
context of the methodology that has been proposed (i.e. the use of scoring models 
in microfinance) (further details are available in the Appendix).
Table 6. Power to predict at different risk thresholds for the model on table 5
  Risk Threshold
All-bad       All-good
Measure Formula 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 100%
Share of 
“Goods” 
approved
Goods Approved / 
(Goods Approved + 
Goods Rejected)
0.00 0.51 0.63 0.76 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.00
Share of 
“ B a d s ” 
approved
Bads Approved / 
(Bads Rejected + 
Bads Approved )
0.00 0.07 0.15 0.34 0.58 0.76 0.89 1.00
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From Table 6, we can see that if a lower threshold of 10% would have been 
used together with the estimated model (Table 5); 63% of all “goods” and also 15% 
of “bad” loans would have been approved without further review. If “very risky” 
cases were defined as those with predicted risk at or above the 30% threshold, then 
the percentage of rejected loans which would have turned out to be “goods” would 
have been substantial. This analysis can be improved and refined by varying the 
thresholds according to the definition and/or perception of “low”, “intermediate/
medium” and “high” loan risks of the institution as well as in consonance to current 
macroeconomic environment, objectives and needs. 
4.2. Discussion of Results
The distinguishing feature of the interpretation of linear regression models is 
that one only needs to specify which variable is changing and by how much while 
specifying that all other variables are being held constant. In contrast, logit models 
are non-linear and as a consequence the effect (on the dependent variable) of a given 
change in an independent variable will depend on the value of that variable at the 
start of its change and the value of the other independent variables in the model 
(Long & Freese, 2003, pp. 95-97). 
In view of this characteristic of logit models, in this section we decided to 
follow a two step strategy in order to discuss our results. First, using the results in 
table 4 we calculated the probability that an artificial “representative borrower” may 
fall in a spell of arrears of 15 days or more, and second we studied the estimated 
impact of changing each of the variables one at a time on repayment performance. 
Moreover, in order to better illustrate our results, we then made extensive use of 
tables and figures. We also compared our results with those from the established 
literature when possible.
In order to select the characteristics of our representative borrower we used 
the descriptive statistics of table 3 and chose the characteristics with higher means 
for the case of dummy variables (because these are therefore the most common 
characteristics), and the average of continuous variables. Proceeding in this way, 
our representative client is a married female merchant aged 42, she is a previously 
existing client of branch 4 with no arrears in her previous loan; her loan, in national 
currency, is for the equivalent of US $504.27 to be repaid in 208 days with a monthly 
interest rate of  4.9%. The guarantee consists of joint liability plus some of the client’s 
personal belongings. Since we have introduced the dummy variable “oilprice” in our 
model to account for changes in the economic conditions, we can also compare how 
our representative borrower would perform in a “normal economic environment”6 
versus a scenario with adverse business conditions. 
 According to the results in table 4, the representative borrower has a 
predicted risk of 0.86% of incurring arrears greater than 15 days under normal 
economic conditions, while the predicted risk for the same client under adverse 
6  In this section we refer to the economic conditions prevailing before the period of oil price instability as 
“normal economic conditions”, perhaps a more precise term would be “conditions prevailing before oil market 
instability”.
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economic conditions is 7.54%. Hence, holding all other factors equal, there is 
an estimated impact of 6.68% in repayment performance due to changes in the 
economic environment. In other words, we can expect that on average 9 out of 1000 
such representative clients would incur spells of arrears of 15 days or more under 
normal conditions, while under adverse conditions, we can expect that on average 
75 out of 1000 representative clients would incur such arrears.
Gender of borrower: now we are ready to study the impact of gender on 
repayment performance. The variable “male” is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that on average males are more risky borrowers than women, 
other things equal, as Reinke (1998, p. 54) finds in his work. However, it is 
interesting to observe that the variable has a somewhat small impact7 on risk. Our 
model suggests that if the representative client was male instead the predicted risk 
would increase by 0.15% under normal conditions, and by 1.21% under adverse 
economic conditions, all other factors equal. This seems to be in accordance with 
Schreiner (2004a, p. 11) who argues that the gender of the borrower is less predictive 
when other characteristics are taken into account (such as the sector of the business). 
Business sector: the following table shows the estimated average effect on 
repayment performance from changing the business sector characteristic of the 
representative client from “merchant” to one of the other business sectors, under 
both “normal” and “adverse” economic conditions while holding all other things 
equal. Note that the results in table 3 indicate that (at least for our sample) the 
business sectors “artisan”, “carpenter’, “baker”, “othermanuf” and “professionals” 
are not statistically different from the base category and thus are not reported in 
table 7 below. We interpret the difference in risk between “merchant” and the 
business sectors omitted in the table as similar to that between “merchant” and the 
base category.
Table 7. Impact of business sector on repayment performance
From To Normal conditions Adverse conditions
merchant grocery -0.65% -5.58%
merchant seamstress -0.17% -1.40%
merchant skilled worker -0.24% -1.95%
merchant transport -0.26% -2.18%
merchant
unskilled workers
(base category)
0.19% 1.49%
As can be seen from table 7, the impacts of changing the sector of the business 
can be small under normal conditions, but under adverse economic conditions the 
impact can be relatively large.
7  In this section, we define “impact of a change of characteristic on repayment performance” as the difference 
between the estimated risk of the representative client once one of the characteristics has been changed and 
the original estimated risk of the representative client. For example, for gender under adverse conditions, the 
impact on risk for changing from a female to a male client ceteris paribus equals 1.21%, the new risk if the 
client is male is 8.76%, and the original risk (female client) is 7.54%.
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Age: the model suggests that, on average, risk decreases with the age of the 
borrower, all other factors equal. This coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Table 
8 below summarises the effect on risk from changes in the age of the representative 
borrower. The percentages show the estimated impact on risk when we change the 
age of the representative client from 42 years to the ages indicated in the table. 
  Table 8. Impact of age on repayment performance
Age from To Normal conditions Adverse conditions
42 years 18 years 0.36% 2.83%
42 years 26 years 0.22% 1.80%
42 years 34 years 0.11% 0.85%
42 years 42 years 0.00% 0.00%
42 years 50 years -0.09% -0.77%
42 years 58 years -0.18% -1.47%
42 years 66 years -0.25% -2.10%
Under normal conditions, if the representative borrower was 18 years old 
instead of 42, the model suggests that, other things equal, the predicted risk of this 
client would be 1.22% rather than 0.86% (a 0.36% impact); while under adverse 
conditions this change would mean that the predicted risk of the client would be 
10.37% instead of 7.54% (a 2.83% impact), other factors equal. The other values 
in the table can be interpreted in a similar fashion: add the values on the “normal 
conditions” column to 0.86% to obtain total risk for a change in the age of the 
borrower under normal conditions, all other things equal. Similarly add the values 
in the “adverse conditions” column to 7.54% to obtain the total risk for a change in 
the age of the borrower under adverse economic conditions, all other factors equal.
Marital status: the coefficient of the variable “married” is significant at the 1% 
level and hence the model suggests that on average married individuals are less risky 
than single, divorced, individuals having free unions, etc, ceteris paribus. The model 
indicates that if the representative client was not married instead, the predicted risk 
would increase by 0.19% under normal economic conditions and by 1.49% under 
adverse conditions, other factors equal. Perhaps this may be an indication that in the 
context of LDCs married individuals are more likely to be concerned about acting in 
accordance with the terms of a contract.
Repayment history of the borrower: the variable “new” has a significant 
coefficient at the 1% level and as one could expect the model indicates that on 
average new clients are riskier than old clients, other factors equal. Under normal 
economic conditions, the model suggests that if the representative client was new 
rather than old the predicted risk would raise by 0.54%, and that under adverse 
conditions the impact on risk would be an increase of 4.18%, all other things equal. 
The coefficient of the variable “prevarrears” is also significant at the 1% level and 
it indicates that on average individuals with a previous history of arrears are more 
likely to continue to incur in arrears in future loans, other things equal. The impact 
of this variable on the risk of the representative client under normal conditions is 
3.13% and under adverse conditions 20.46%.
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Length of repayment period: the variables “repayperiod” and “repayperiod2” 
are both significant at the 1% level. Clearly, these variables must be interpreted 
together since it is not possible to vary one while keeping the other fixed. Figure 
4 below shows the estimated impact of changing the repayment period of the 
representative client from 208 days to the number of days indicated on the horizontal 
axis under both normal and adverse economic conditions while holding all other 
things equal.
 Note that the impact of changing the repayment period from 208 days to 
shorter periods is increasingly negative as we reduce the number of days in the period. 
This means that on average the risk of the representative borrower is lower at shorter 
loan repayment periods. The reason for this may be that the shorter the repayment 
periods are, the less chance that a given borrower will fall in a spell of arrears. On 
the other hand, the impact on risk of rising the repayment period above 208 days is 
positive, but note however that the impact on risk increases at a decreasing rate (see 
regression results). One possible reason for this phenomenon may be that there are 
two effects at work: a “time effect” and a “loan officer effect”. Hence, although one 
can expect that the longer the time to maturity the greater the chance that a given 
borrower will fall in a spell of arrears, it may be the case that the loan officers are 
doing a good job at issuing “longer term”8 loans to the safest clients, and that this 
fact somewhat counters the effect of repayment period on the risk of default.
Figure 4. Impact of repayment period on predicted risk of arrears
Type of guarantee: the dummy variable “jointliability” (joint liability included 
in the guarantee) has a coefficient significant at the 1% level. Thus, the model 
indicates that, on average, loans having this type of guarantee are riskier, other things 
equal. This is a sensible result since loan officers are likely to require better guarantees 
for cases they may assess as riskier. The impact on risk from changing the attribute 
of the representative client from having ‘jointliability’ guarantee to not having one 
is  -0.14% under normal conditions, and -1.13% under adverse conditions. Note 
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8  In microfinance, loans tend to have very short term maturities. In our sample the average loan had a 
repayment period of only 208 days.
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that the coefficients of the variables “mortgage” and “personal belongings” are not 
significantly different from zero at any conventional level, this suggests that these 
variables may represent guarantees which are required as a matter of routine: the 
mortgages for housing loans and the personal belongings for ordinary micro-loans. 
 Interest rate: the variable “intrate” is significant at the 1% level of 
significance and hence the model suggests that on average a higher interest rate 
indicates that the loan is riskier than otherwise, other factors equal. Note that this 
variable may capture subjective observations by both the loan officer and branch 
manager who are likely to require a higher interest rate for cases that they regard to 
be more risky. Table 9 below summarises the effect on risk from changes in ‘intrate’. 
Table 9. Impact of monthly interest rate on repayment performance
Interest rate from To Normal conditions Adverse conditions
4.80% 1.00% -0.35% -2.90%
4.80% 2.00% -0.27% -2.28%
4.80% 3.00% -0.19% -1.58%
4.80% 4.00% -0.10% -0.79%
4.80% 5.00% 0.01% 0.09%
4.80% 5.50% 0.07% 0.57%
Loan size: The variables “lnsize” and “lnsize2” are both significant at the 1% 
level. Figure 5 below summarises the estimated impact of changing the loan size 
of the representative client from $510 to the amount indicated on the horizontal 
axis under both normal and adverse economic conditions while holding all other 
things equal. Note that the estimated impact of changing the loan size from 
$510 to smaller amounts is positive. This means that, on average, the risk of the 
representative borrower is greater at smaller loan sizes, all other factors equal. On 
the other hand, the estimated impact of raising the loan size above $510 is negative. 
Hence, on average, the risk of the representative client is smaller at larger loan sizes 
ceteris paribus. 
Figure 5. Impact of loan size on predicted risk of arrears
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This result contrasts with that in Schreiner (2004a, p. 12). where the link 
between risk and the amount disbursed is found to be positive but weak in the sense 
that the variable’s impact on risk is small. In our sample, the link between risk and 
the amount disbursed appears to be negative but weak.
 Branch of the microfinance institution: our results in table 4 suggest that 
none of the lender’s branches is riskier than the base category (central office) at any 
conventional level of significance. We interpret this result as an indication that the 
effect on repayment performance from changing the branch of the representative 
client from “branch 4” to one of the other branches is not statistically different from 
zero at the usual levels of significance, ceteris paribus.   
 Currency: The variable “currency” is insignificant at any conventional level 
of significance. Hence, our model suggests that for the period under study, the loans 
disbursed to the group of borrowers requesting their credit in U.S. dollars were not 
riskier than those disbursed to clients with credit in local currency, other things 
equal.
6. Conclusions
The results of the present study provide evidence that female client’s repayment 
performance is better than that of male’s at the 1% level of significance. According 
to the logistic regression estimated in the present paper a representative male client 
had a 0.15% higher probability of incurring in a spell of arrears of more than 15 days 
than a representative female client during the period January 2003 to June 2004 
before the increase of international oil prices impacted the Nicaraguan economy, 
and a 1.21% higher probability of incurring in arrears greater than 15 days during 
the subsequent period. 
 However, it is important to note that the model also shows that gender has 
a relatively small impact on repayment risk (as defined in this specific context). In 
fact, the effect of gender on risk seems to be much lower than what popular wisdom 
would suggest specially when compared to that of other variables. For instance, the 
results suggest a predicted negative impact of 6.68% in the repayment performance 
of a representative (female) client due to the changes in the economic environment 
(oil price crisis). The model also indicates that an increase in the repayment period 
of the representative (female) client from 208 days to 395 days would have meant 
a 1.59% higher probability of incurring in a spell of arrears of more than 15 days 
during the period January 2003 to June 2004 (before the increase of international 
oil prices), and a 11.49% higher probability of incurring in arrears greater than 15 
days during the ensuing period.
 In sum, we conclude that other characteristics of the borrower as well as 
changes in the economic environment can have a similar or larger impact on risk 
than gender when it comes to repayment performance. Since in microfinance the 
repayment period of the loans tends to be very short, including economic conditions 
variables seems to be an important possibility to consider. 
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Appendix. A RESET test for the logit model
In this appendix we describe the steps we followed in order to perform the RESET 
test for the model in table 5 that includes characteristics of the borrower, the lender, 
the loan and a variable to allow for changes the economic circumstances.
1. We first state our null and alternative hypotheses: 
     H0: the model is correctly specified
     H
1
: H
0
 is false.
2. From the original model shown in table 4, we obtain the estimated latent 
continuous variable (ŷi* = xi β). 
3. We then rerun the model introducing the square of the estimated latent 
continuous variable as an additional regressor. We call this additional 
variable “xbeta2” as can be seen at the bottom of table A1.
4. Since the resulting z-test for the additional regressor “xbeta2” is statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level of significance; we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the model is correctly specified.
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Table A1. Rerun of model with the addition of the square of the estimated latent 
continuous variable as an additional regressor
Logit estimates Number of obs   =  48602 
Wald chi2(42)     = 2985.81 
Prob > chi2         = 0 
Pseudo R2          = 0.2272 
Log pseudolikelihood = -8940.2773
  
  Robust   
arrears>15        Definition Coef.   Std. Err. z  
artisan  1 if artisan, 0 otherwise -0.1498344 0.2014544 -0.74  
carpenter  1 if carpenter, 0 otherwise 0.2403979 0.2939691 0.82  
merchant  1 if trader, 0 otherwise -0.197247 0.0965535 -2.04 **
seamstress  1 if seamstress, 0 otherwise -0.4181718 0.2045315 -2.04 **
baker  1 if baker, 0 otherwise -0.5493202 0.3688338 -1.49  
othermanuf   1 if other manufacturer, 0 otherwise 0.0138067 0.1347788 0.10  
grocery 1 if grocery, 0 otherwise -1.614048 0.4463006 -3.62 *
transport  1 if transport, 0 otherwise -0.5627059 0.1907459 -2.95 *
professionals  1 if professional, 0 otherwise -0.1236178 0.1609056 -0.77  
skillwrk 1 if skilled worker, 0 otherwise -0.5199389 0.2480817 -2.10 **
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.1633859 0.0461094 3.54 *
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise -0.1971569 0.0419855 -4.70 *
lnsize  Loan size in U.S. dollars, continuous variable -0.0001326 0.0000481 -2.75 *
lnsize2  Square of lnsize 7.93E-09 2.61E-09 3.04 *
age  Age of borrower in years, continuous variable -0.0146661 0.0021034 -6.97 *
repayperiod   Repayment period in days, continuous variable 0.0150499 0.0024188 6.22 *
repayperiod2  Square of repayperiod -0.0000155 3.99E-06 -3.90 *
intrate   Monthly interest rate (percentage) 13.30484 4.009336 3.32 *
mortgage   1 if the guarantee includes mortgage, 0 otherwise -0.1008657 0.2676945 -0.38  
jointliability   
1 if the guarantee includes joint liability, 0 
otherwise 0.1766317 0.0593417 2.98 *
persbelong
1 if the guarantee includes client’s personal 
belongings, 0 otherwise 0.1959886 0.1327984 1.48  
currency    1 if currency is USA dollars, 0 otherwise 0.2502312 0.1673363 1.50  
new    1 if customer is new, 0 otherwise 0.4909269 0.0526477 9.32 *
prevarrears  
1 if customer had arrears > 15 days in previous 
loan, 0 otherwise 1.570582 0.2737796 5.74 *
branch1  1 if branch is branch 1, 0 otherwise -0.458097 0.5342824 -0.86  
branch2    1 if branch is branch 2, 0 otherwise 0.2574912 0.5320671 0.48  
branch3  1 if branch is branch 3, 0 otherwise -0.4419576 0.5334755 -0.83  
branch4  1 if branch is branch 4, 0 otherwise -0.3083845 0.5326621 -0.58  
branch5   1 if branch is branch 5, 0 otherwise -0.3995918 0.5318993 -0.75  
branch6 1 if branch is branch 6, 0 otherwise -0.5935695 0.5350369 -1.11  
branch7   1 if branch is branch 7, 0 otherwise -0.4442774 0.5337649 -0.83  
branch8  1 if branch is branch 8, 0 otherwise -0.4707834 0.5335974 -0.88  
branch9  1 if branch is branch 9, 0 otherwise -0.7166945 0.5387715 -1.33  
branch10   1 if branch is branch 10, 0 Otherwise -0.3701425 0.5350009 -0.69  
branch11 1 if branch is branch 11, 0 otherwise -0.2705657 0.5337203 -0.51  
branch12    1 if branch is branch 12, 0 otherwise 0.1760482 0.5338904 0.33  
branch13     1 if branch is branch 13, 0 otherwise -0.1670832 0.5342952 -0.31  
branch14  1 if branch is branch 14, 0 otherwise -0.9048754 0.5815085 -1.56  
branch15   1 if branch is branch 15, 0 otherwise 0.0941953 0.5497091 0.17  
branch16     1 if branch is branch 16, 0 otherwise -0.8503106 0.6458081 -1.32  
oilprice  1 if loan matures after 30/06/04, 0 otherwise 2.259686 0.2104019 10.74 *
xbeta2   Variable for RESET test 0.0017809 0.0151395 0.12  
_cons  Constant -6.876992 0.7950128 -8.65 *
* significant at the 1% level (two sided test)
** significant at the 5% level (two sided test)
*** significant at the 10% level (two sided test)
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